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December 1987 Abstract 
This  paper  extends  the  implicit contracts framework  to  allow for on-the-job 
search.  It is shown  that involuntary unemployment  can  arise in  such  a 
framework  without placing any  a priori restrictions on  either wages  or 
severance  payments.  The  model  also implies  that firms  will practice a  two-tier 
system of  adjusting their labor force.  In the first stage,  workers  who  receive 
outside job offers leave  the firm.  The  second  stage consists of firms hiring 
additional  workers  during good  states of  nature,  and  laying off workers  during 
bad  states of nature.  Furthermore,  during "bad  enough"  states of nature,  firms 
will  offer a severance  payment  or bonus  for those who  want  to  voluntarily 
leave,  and  then  lay off workers  without offering a large enough  severance 
payment  to compensate  them  for being unemployed. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional  models of equilibrium unemployment have failed to explain why 
some unemployment might be involuntary.  For example, sequential  search models, 
such as Lucas and Prescott's (1974) paper, imply that workers wi 11 become 
unemployed when their expected present discounted value of  future utility is 
greater when they are unemployed than employed.  Another objection to the 
search model's explanation of  unemployment is the assumption that unemployed 
search is more productive than employed search.  This assumption has been 
frequently questioned and recent evidence suggests the opposite might be 
true. ' 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a consistent story of involuntary 
unemployment without placing any a priori restrictions on either wages or 
severance payments.  While the existence of  involuntary unemployment is by no 
means universally accepted, most economists accept it as a stylized fact of the 
labor market.'  It therefore warrants an explanation within the traditional 
framework of equilibrium economics.  This paper imbeds a simple model of 
on-the-job search in an implicit contracts framework.  Implicit contracts 
provided one of the first equilibrium attempts to explain involuntary 
unemployment.  In Azariadis' seminal work, involuntary unemployment results 
from three assumptions:  1)  Workers are risk averse while firms are risk 
neutral.  2)  Working is a 0 or 1  decision, that is, hours worked per worker is 
not a choice variable.  3)  Firms cannot make severance payments to  unemployed 
workers. Given these assumptions, involuntary unemployment results.  Ex  ante 
the optimal contract calls for workers to become unemployed during certain 
states of nature and to consume the value of their leisure, thus truncating bad states of nature.  Since workers are risk averse, however, and desire a 
constant consumption stream, it is not optimal to lower the wages of employed 
workers in order to induce them to leave. Similarly, by assumption, firms 
cannot make severance payments in order to induce workers to voluntarily leave. 
Another characteristic of Azariadis' model is that there is 
overemployment.  That is, even though there is involuntary unemployment in the 
sense that laid-off workers are worse off than their employed counterparts, 
there is over-employment because there is more employment and less 
unemployment than would occur in a pure Walrasian market.  Workers remain 
employed even though their marginal productivity of  labor is less than their 
reservation wage.  Both involuntary unemployment and overemployment result 
from the assumption that firms cannot make severance payments to laid-off 
workers.  This inability to pay severance payments implies that firms will 
partially insure workers against the risk of being laid-off by remaining 
employed longer than they would in a pure Walrasian market.  Once severance 
payments are allowed, unemployment becomes purely voluntary and there is 
production efficiency. 
The goal of this paper is to integrate a simple model of  on-the-job search 
in an implicit contracts framework.  This paper investigates the conditions 
under which involuntary unemployment will occur without placing any a priori 
restrictions on severance payments.  Like Azariadis' model, an explanation of 
involuntary unemployment will  necessitate their seeing overemployment.  This 
is in contrast to Grossman and Hart who attempted to explain underemployment. 
That is, Grossman and Hart attempt to  explain the ex post regret on the part 
of firms in the sense that they are laying off workers who ex post they would want to remain employed.  However, all  unemployment was voluntary.  A recent 
paper by Oswald provides the first attempt to explain both involuntary 
unemployment and underemployment, but to do so he exogenously assumed that 
severance payments were zero.  On the other hand, this paper attempts to 
explain involuntary unemployment, i.e. the ex  post rqgret of workers in the 
sense that ex post they would rather remain employed with the firm given the 
prevai  1  i ng wage rate. 
In order to explain involuntary unemployment, it is promising to  follow 
the lines of Kahn  (1985).  He showed that complete insurance is not possible 
(or  that wages will  not be independent of the state of the world) when a firm 
cannot monitor a worker's alternative wage offer.  Arvan (1986) extended 
Kahn's analysis and suggested this might explain why involuntary layoffs 
occur.  In Arvan's model, firms cannot insure against layoffs  because of the 
need to promote on-the-job search.  However, Arvan implicitly constrains the 
severance payment to laid-off workers to equal the severance payment offered 
those who voluntarily quit their jobs.  It is this assumption that is crucial 
to  explaining involuntary unemployment in his model. 
This paper is similar to both Kahn's and Arvan's in  that it integrates the 
original  implicit contract model with a simple model of  on-the-job search. 
The structure of the model differs from theirs by assuming that on-the-job 
search may or may not result in a job offer, and by assuming that searching 
does not affect the resulting wage offer.  If a worker receives a job offer, 
the present paper assumes the offer is exogenously given.  These assumptions 
are not necessary and are meant to simp1  ify the analysis.  To explain 
involuntary unemployment, no a priori restrictions wi 11 be placed on the 
structure of severance payments.  The restrictions placed on severance payments result from the incentive compatibility constraints.  However, the 
last section does assume that severance payments must be non-negative. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section one considers the 
symmetric information case when a firm can observe both a worker's search 
intensity and whether or not the worker receives a job offer.  The optimal 
contract in this case implies complete insurance.  Section two drops the 
assumption that a firm can observe a worker's search intensity, but assumes 
the firm can observe which workers receive job offers by making severance 
payments conditional on the worker accepting an offer.  The section shows that 
the inability of  a firm to observe a worker's search efforts  is not sufficient 
to  explain involuntary unemployment.  However, the model results in  incomplete 
risk-sharing because firms trade off their desire to provide incentives for 
on-the-job search and to insure workers against future wage changes.  The 
optimal contract is also characterized by  production efficiency for laid-off 
workers.  However, workers who receive job offers are shown to  leave more 
often than would occur in a Walrasian world, implying that identical workers 
(in  terms of  productivity) will  leave the firm and commence working for the 
firm simultaneously.  The third section investigates the  .conditions necessary 
to  explain involuntary unemployment.  It shows that when firms cannot observe 
both a worker's  search efforts and whether or not a worker receives a job 
offer, the incentive compatible contract implies that laid-off workers will  be 
better off than their employed counterparts.  However, this result assumes 
that firms can tax departing workers.  If this assumption is dropped, the 
optimal contract results in involuntary unemployment.  This occurs in order to 
provide the proper incentive in "bad enough" states of nature for job finders 
to  truthfully reveal that they received an offer.  The section also discusses how  the preceding analysis would  change if a worker  could save  or borrow  for 
himself  rather than firms also acting as  a bank  for workers.  The  last section 
concludes  and  discusses  possible extensions  for future research. 
I. THE  MODEL  WITH  SYMMETRIC  INFORMATION 
Consider  an  economy  that lasts for two periods  indexed  by t =  1,  2.  Labor 
is  hired in the first  period where  production takes  place according to  a 
deterministic production function,  f(N).  Production  in the  second  period is 
subject  to  a random  shock,  8,  where  the range of 8 is the closed  interval 
CO, 8"l,  with distribution functions  g(8)  and  G(B>,  respectively.  The 
model  may  be  interpreted in  a sectoral  shifts framework.  Workers  search  for 
alternate work  in the first  period in  case  the demand  for the industry's 
output falls substantially in the second  period or,  alternatively, if there is 
a bad  shock  to  production in  the second  period. 
In  the first period,  workers  choose  their search  effort, A,  where  X 
represents  the probability that a worker  will receive a job offer.  A  worker's 
search  intensity is  chosen  in the first period before  the realization of the 
random  shock  to  firm  production  is realized.  Searching is assumed  not  to 
affect  the productivity of a worker.  For  simplicity, it  is also assumed  that 
searching does  not require any  monetary  cost,  but requires instead a "psychic" 
cost  c(A>,  which  is assumed  not to  affect a worker's marginal  utility of 
income.  The  assumption  that search effort enters  separably in  the worker's 
utility  function is  not crucial; it  is  meant  to  aid comparison  with other 
implicit contract models.  If a  worker  receives a job offer, it  is  assumed  to 
be  for  an  exogenous  amount,  w'.  Workers  are assumed  not to  be  able to affect this wage  offer through  searching.  It is temporarily assumed  that the firm 
cannot  hire additional  labor  in the second  period.  This assumption  will later 
be  dropped  so  that additional  labor can  be  hired in period two at the market 
wage  rate,  w'. 
Firms  compete  for workers  in the first  period by offering an  employment 
contract.  Competition among  firms for workers  impliies that the equilibrium 
contract will be  chosen  to  maximize  the expected  utility  of  a representative 
worker  subject to  a zero expected-profit condition for the firm. 
Contracts  consist of wages,  severance  payments,  lay-off probabilities and 
search  intensity.  That  is, a contract consists of {wl , w,(e),  1(8>, q(8), 
s1(8), s,(8),  A),  where  wl  is the first  period wage;  w,(8>  is the 
second  period wage  chosen  after the realization of  8;  l(8) and  q(8)  are  the 
respective separation probabilities in the second  period for workers  who  did 
not receive a job offer and  did receive a job offer after 
the end  of the first period;  s,  (8) and  sq(8> are  the severance payments 
(or taxes)  given to  (or applied to)  workers  who  did not receive job offers and 
workers  who  did receive job offers respectively.  For  the full information 
case  considered below,  one  can  think of the firm  as  also choosing  the search 
intensity of workers,  A. 
Assuming  that workers  cannot  save  or dissave  (this assumption  will be 
dropped  later),  so  that their income  in  every period is identical  to their 
wage  in that period,  the expected uti  1  i  ty  of a representative worker  equals: where  B is  the reservation wage  of a worker,  or the income  equivalent of  a 
worker  consuming  his endowed  labor. It  is  also assumed  that U"(.>  <  0,  -- or 
equivalently,  that workers  are risk averse.  The  intuition behind the above 
equation is as  follows:  X(l-q(8>)  is  the probability that a worker 
receives a job offer, but remain employed  at the firm earning w,;  Xq(9) 
is  the probability that a worker  receives a job offer and  accepts it, in  which 
case  the worker  earns  w'  plus the severance  payment  s,;  (l-X>(1-1(8)>  is 
the probability that a worker  does  not find other employment  and  is  not laid 
off,  in  which  case  he  earns  w2;  (1-1)  is the probability that the  worker 
does  not receive an  offer and  is subsequently  laid off,  in which'case he  earns 
the value of his leisure,  B,  and  the severance  payment  s,(8>.  Assuming 
the firm is  risk neutral, it  has  preferences given by 
The  optimal employment-  contract is  for the firm  or the planner to choose 
{wl,  w2(8),  s,(8),  s1(8), q(8),  1(8),  A,  N)  to  solve: max  EV(wl,  w~(€J),  s,(8),  sl(B),  q(B),  I(@),  A) 
En(w  w2  (81,  s,(8),  s,  (B),  q(@), I(@),  A,  N)  2  0 
The  first-order conditions  for this problem are: 
va)  8f'([l-Xq(f3)1N)  =  w'  when  8 >  8' 
vb)  8f'([(l-l(8))(1-X)lN>=B  when8<e1 
where  8  <  8' => q(8)=1,  0  <  l(8)  <  1 and  8 >  8'  => 1(8)=0,  0  <  q(8)  <  1. where  1 (Ot)=O and  q(et>=l  and  y  are the Lagrangian  associated with the 
expected profit constraint and  y, =  Ny. 
The  solution to this problem  is  straightforward.  Since  there are no 
informational  asymmetries,  the optimal  contract involves both perfect  risk 
sharing according  to Borch's  rule and  production efficiency.  Workers  are 
guaranteed  the same  income  during all states of the world,  independent  of  both 
the  state of nature and  whether  or not a worker  receives a job offer.  Workers 
successful  in  their job search  subsidize  those  who  were  unsuccessful. 
Production efficiency implies that the first workers  to leave are those  with 
the best outside opportunities,  i.e.  the workers  who  receive offers.  After 
all the  workers  who  have  found  jobs  leave,  firms must  adjust the  labor force 
by  laying off workers.  Firms  lay off workers  until the marginal  productivity 
is  equal  to the reservation wage  of the marginal  worker.  Workers  are assumed 
to  have  non-market  opportunities  that give the agent  an  income  equivalent of 
B.  Firms  then  subsidize workers  who  are laid off by giving them  a severance 
payment  so  that the  worker  is indifferent between  staying with the  firm  or 
leaving the  firm. 
Firms  also force workers  to supply  the optimum amount  of search  intensity 
given by  viii).  One  can  think of wages  being set equal  to  zero when  workers 
supply  less  than the required amount  of search  effort.  The  marginal  cost of 
searching  is  equal  to the marginal  benefit of searching.  The  marginal  benefit 
of searching is the difference between  what  the worker  will earn in  an 
alternate job,  w',  and  what  he  would produce  in the current job,  8f1(.).  In 
good  states of nature  (8  >  80, this difference  is  zero from production 
efficiency,  while in  bad  states of nature the difference is  w'-B.  The marginal  benefit of searching is thus  the probability that workers  are laid 
off, G(B'),  multiplied by  the value in  utils of earning w'  versus  B.  Since 
the marginal  cost of searching is in  units of  utils this quantity is 
multiplied by a worker's marginal  utility  of income. 
Not  surprisingly,  the optimal  contract with full information implies 
complete  insurance and,  hence,  with asymmetric  information it  would not 
provide workers  with any  incentive to  search.  The  next  section considers  the 
optimal  contract when  a  firm  cannot monitor a worker's  search  intensity and 
can  choose  the separation probabilities of workers,  that is,  the  firm  can  tax 
departing workers.  Both of these  assumptions  are maintained unti  1  section 3. 
11.  IMPERFECT  MONITORING 
In  this section, it  is assumed  that a worker's  search  intensity is  private 
information to  the worker.  However,  firms can observe  which workers  receive 
jobs  in the second  period in  the following manner:  severance  payments  can  be 
made  conditional on  the worker  accepting a  job offer.  With asymmetric 
information,  firms choose  the optimal  contract on  the assumption  that workers 
will then choose  X to  maximize  their utility  given this contract.  That  is, 
given a contract  {w, ,  w,  (8>, s,  (8),  s , (€11,  q(8),  1(8),  N)  workers 
will choose  their desired search  intensity,  X*  such  that: 
A*  =  argmax  EV(wl,  w,(8),  sq(8),  s,  (81,  q(8), I(@),  1) 
X E  C0,lI Replacing the above condition with the first-order condition for an 
agent's search effort yields the reaction function for workers.  It gives how 
agents will choose X  in response to  the employment contract.  This incentive 
compatibility constraint is appended to the planner's  (or  the firm's)  problem 
in the previous section, so  that the optimal  contract is to choose {wl(B>, 
w2(8),  sq(8),  sr(8),  q(f3),  1(6), A,  N)  in order to solve the following problem: 
max EV(w,,  w2(8),  s,(8),  s,  (8),  q(8),  I(@),  X) 
The first-order conditions for this problem are va)  8f1(El-Xq(8)IN)  - w' 
=  {U(wl+sq> - U(w,>  - U'(w1+sq>[(w'+s,> - w21)/U'(w1+s,>  when  8  >  8' 
vb)  8f1(C(1-l(e))(l-X)IN)  =  B  when  8  <  8' 
where  l(8') =  0  and  q(8') =  1. 
vi)  fl(N> =  w, 
Using  va)  and  vb)  to  simplify ii)  yields: 
i  ia>  U1(w,(8>)  =  y,  (1-1)  when  8  <  8'. 
( 1-A-y2  1 
iib)  U'(w,(8>>, =  yl  ( 1-Xq(8)  when  8  >  8' 
C1-(X+y,  )q(8)1 
In  bad  states of nature when  lay offs occur,  8  <  8',  we  have  complete 
insurance for laid-off workers,  i.e.  B  +  sl =  Wr.  Workers  who  receive job 
offers  are  subsidized  and  earn more  than  those  who  do not find other 
employment,  i.e.  w' +  s,  >  w,.  The  sign of sq depends  on  the magnitude of 
the outside wage  offer w'.  If  w'  is small,  it  will always  be  a subsidy,  while if 
w'  is large it  may  be  a tax.  In  good  states of the  world where  8  >  8', 
no workers  are laid off, and  the workers  receiving job offers earn more  than 
those  who  did not find a1 ternate employment.  However,  this differential gets 
smaller with better states of  nature.  This  implies  the paradoxical  result that the marginal  productivity of labor decreases  with better states of nature 
when  8 >  8'.  In  the  limit, when  q(8)  =  0,  and  thus  when  no workers 
leave  the firm,  workers  will earn equal  wages  in  both the first  period and  the 
second period.  It should  be  noted that this solution implicitly assumes  that 
firms  have  the power  to  either subsidize or tax  workers  who  leave.  That  is, 
even  though  workers  who  find alternate employment  might earn more  at their new 
jobs,  w'  >  WE,  firms are assumed  to  be  able to  tax them  (or  sabotage  their 
future job prospects)  to  prevent them  from leaving,  thus regulating the number 
of workers  who  leave  the firm. 
Since workers  respond optimally to changes  in the contract offered to 
them,  equation vii>.states  that a worker's  search  intensity will be  chosen  so 
that the change  in  the marginal  cost to  workers  from increasing their search 
effort is  equal  to  the marginal  benefit (expressed  in  units of  utility) to the 
firm resulting from workers  increasing  their search effort.  The  marginal 
benefit from increasing a worker's  search  intensity is the difference between 
what  the worker i  s paid,  w2 , and  the sum  of what  he  produces,  8f'  (.  > ,  and 
the severance  payment  given to  departing workers,  s,(B).  This implies the 
familiar  result:  that the optimal  contract  will specify less  search effort 
than the full information contract when  yr  >  0.  That  is, 1  is  chosen 
such  that the marginal  benefit to  increasing search effort is strictly 
positive.  The  proof that yz is  strictly  positive follows from the first- 
order conditions.  If y~  <  0 then workers  would .not supply any  search 
effort.  A  sufficient condition for  an  interior solution to  occur  is that 
~'(0)  =  0,  ~'(1)  =  and  w'  >  8,  i.e.  it  is costless to  exert a little 
search effort and  there is  a positive benefit to  searching,  while the marginal 
cost of searching,  so  that a job offer is  certain,  is  sufficiently costly so 
the probability a worker  will receive an  offer is less than one. Notice,  there is  production efficiency when  firms lay off workers.  This 
is  not surprising since there is complete  insurance for laid-off workers. 
When  the marginal  worker  to  leave,  however,  is  a worker  who  has  received a  job 
offer,  i.e.  when  no workers  are  laid off,  there is  underemployment.  Workers 
who  find jobs  leave more  often than in  a Walrasian market.  This  is symmetric 
with the result in  Azariadis' model  that there will be  overemployment  when 
there is involuntary unemployment.  The  intuition behind the present result is 
that on-the-margin firms find it  optimal  to  provide additional  incentive for 
on-the-job search by allowing workers  to  earn more  after they find another 
job,  and  also by allowing them  to  leave more  often than  they would  in the full 
information case.  From  va),  the amount  production differs from that which 
would occur  in  Walrasian market  is  dependent  on  the curvature of the utility 
function,  or how  risk averse workers  are.  The  more  risk averse  are workers, 
the greater the need  to  insure a worker's  income.  Because  this results in 
less  search effort,  there is  a greater need  to  provide incentives for 
on-the-job search by allowing them  to  leave more  often than in  a world with 
symmetric  information. 
Given  that 8fi(.)  >  w',  there is an  incentive for workers  who  receive 
job offers to  recontract with the firm.  This  is  not possible however,  given 
the assumption  that firms can only observe which  workers  received job offers 
after the offers were  accepted.  In  addition,  there is the implicit assumption 
that firms cannot hire these workers  back  after the offer has  been  accepted. 
This is  meant  to  imply that offers cannot  be  costlessly observed.  If the firm 
could costlessly observe a worker's offer,  there would  always  be  production 
efficiency because  firms could bribe workers  who  find jobs to  continue 
employment  by offering them  a higher wage  rate,  w'.  If the marginal 
productivity of labor is greater  than w',  then the firm has  an  incentive to 
induce a worker  who  received an  offer to  stay since  they can  produce more  at 
their present job than they can  at  an  alternative job. Underemployment also results when 8  > 8'  because firms, by  assumption, 
cannot hire workers in the second period at the market wage rate, w'.  If 
additional  labor can be hired, then an interesting result occurs.  Workers 
will  simultaneously leave the firm and accept employment with the firm.  Since 
the marginal productivity of labor is greater than w',  the firm will  have an 
incentive to hire additional  workers at w'.  Although ex  post this seems 
wasteful  (although  no mobility costs are built into the model),  ex  ante such 
behavior is necessary in order to provide workers with the proper incentives 
to search in the first period. 
To  formalize this, assume that the firm can hire n(8)  workers in the 
second period at a market wage rate of w'.  The optimal contract is then to 
choose {w, (8)  , w2(8),  s,(8),  s  , (B) , q(8),  1(8), X,  n(B),  N)  in order to solve 
the following problem: 
max EV(w, , w,(8),  s,(8),  s,  (B),  q(8),  1(8), A) 
s.t. 
EII(w,,  ~,(8),  sq(8),  ~1(8),  q(8),  I(@),  X,  N)  >  0 
s.t. The first-order conditions for this problem are 
{U(w8+s,)  - U(w2)  - U'(w'+sq)[(wl+sq)  - wZI}/U'(w'+sq)  for 8  >  8' 
vi)  8f1(C1-Xq(B)IN  +  n(8))  =  w'  for 8  > 8' 
vii)  8f1(C(1-l(B))(l-A)IN)  =  B  for 8  <  8',  where 1(8'>  =  0  and q(8')  =  1. 
Using v)  and vi)  to simplify ii)  yields: 
The results of this exercise are as follows:  Workers who stay with the 
firm earn a wage rate, w,,  which is  independent of the state of the world. Workers who receive job offers receive a severance payment from the firms and 
will always accept outside job offers.  When workers are laid off by the firm, 
8 <  8', complete severance payments will be offered to them, thus there 
will  be neither under nor overemployment, the marginal  productivity of labor 
will  be equal  to B.  No additional  workers will  be hired in these states of 
nature.  When 8  >  8' ; however, so that no workers are being laid off, the 
firm will  hire additional  workers at a wage of w'  until production efficiency 
prevai  1  s. 
This contract implies a two-tier system for adjusting a firm's work 
force.  Firms first offer a severance payment to workers who wish to 
voluntarily leave the firm.  Every worker who has found another job will then 
accept this offer.  In more complex models, one can think of the severance 
payment offered to departing workers as also consisting of  possible early 
retirement benefits, etc..  After workers accept this offer, the firm then 
adjusts the labor force by laying off workers or hiring new workers until  it 
reaches the desired level of  employment.  This sort of two-tier system does 
seem to have its counterpart in the world.  The implication that workers, will 
be induced to quit while the firm hires new workers also seems to occur. 
Although the current analysis indicates that those who find jobs will always 
leave the firm, this result is because there are no adjustment costs incurred 
when hiring new workers.  If there were adjustment costs  (or  firm specific 
human capital),  not all of  the workers who found jobs would leave the firm. 
It should be noted that since every worker who receives an outside job 
offer is allowed to accept the offer, the assumption that firms have the power 
to tax workers who leave is no longer necessary.  Condition  iii) assumes that 
the severance payment to workers who receive job offers might be negative. 
Dropping this assumption, however, would not change the nature of the results. The  condition for the optimum  search intensity can  be  determined by 
substituting ii),  iv) and  v)  into ix): 
Since  YE,  cl'(X),  y,  >  0  the optimal  contract implies  that s1(8) >  s,(B>. 
The  intuition behind this result is straightforward.  Consider  the optimal 
contract when  workers  are risk neutral.  In this case,  production efficiency 
results and  workers  are paid the value of their marginal  productivity in  every 
state of the world.  Assuming  risk neutrality,  workers  would  earn 0, when  8 
<  e', and  would  earn w'  when  8  >  8'.  The  first-period wage  would be 
chosen  so that firms earn zero expected profits.  As  workers  become  risk 
averse,  firms trade off the incentives or providing on-the-job search  for 
insuring workers  against wage  changes.  First-period wages  would be  reduced in 
order to  reduce  the dispersion in second-period earnings;  that is,  st(@)  > 
s,  (8). 
Otherwise,  it  would have  been  preferable to  keep  the contract that resulted 
when  workers  were  risk neutral  as  it  also providec  the proper  incentives for 
on-the-job search. 
The  above  contract must  be  modified when  the assumption  that firms can 
observe  which  workers  receive job offers is dropped,  since  the above  contract 
will not be  incentive compatible.  This  is  because  the severance payment 
offered  to workers  who  find alternate employment  is  less than the one  offered 
to workers who  are laid off (which  just compensates  a worker  for being 
unemployed);  workers  who  did not receive job offers will never  want  to  pretend that they did receive a job offer.  The opposite is not true, however, when a 
large fraction of  the labor force is being laid off.  Workers who found other 
jobs will wish to pretend they did not receive a job offer so  they can be laid 
off and thereby collect the larger severance payment offered laid-off 
workers.  The next section considers the optimal contract when the firm cannot 
observe a worker's search intensity, or whether or not a worker receives a job 
offer. 
111.  IMPERFECT MONITORING OF SEARCH EFFORTS 
The assumption that firms can hire additional  labor in the second period 
will  be maintained in this section, although this assumption is not necessary 
for the following results. If  firms  cannot monitor who receives job offers, 
then the optimal contract in the previous section is not incentive 
compatible.  The incentive-compatible contract will  be characterized by either 
involuntary unemployment or the opposite: involuntary employment, where 
unemployed workers are better off than their employed counterparts.  The 
condition under which the first occurs, is if  the firm cannot tax departing 
workers.  The second result occurs if  the firm has the power to tax departing 
workers, and thus the power to choose the separation rates for workers. 
To  solve for the optimal contract, when firms cannot observe which workers 
receive job offers, the following incentive compatibility constraint must be 
placed on  the problem: The  left  hand  of the above  equation is  the expected  utility of a worker if 
he  admits  he  received a  job offer, while  the right-hand side  is the expected 
utility  of a worker if he  does  not admit he  received a  job offer.  In this 
case,  when  he  is  not laid off  he  earns  w,  <  w',  since  the  firm  can  restrict 
his mobility.  The  optimal  contract with this restriction will choose 
{w, (8),  w,(8),  s,(8),  s  (8),  q(8),  I(@),  A,  N,  n(8))  to  solve: 
max  EV(w  w2(8),  s,(8),  s  I (8),  q(8),  1(8), 1) 
s. t. 
EII(w,,  wZ(8),  sq(8),  s l(B),  q(8),  1(8),  A,  N)  >  0 
s.t. 
.f{l-q(8)  )U(w2 (8)  +  q(8)U(w1+s, (8)  ))g(8)d8 - 
J{(1--1(8>>U(~2(8>  -  l(B)U(B+sl(B)))g(B)d8-  ~'(1)  =  0 
s.t. 
q(e)u(wl+s,(e))  2  i(e)u(w8+s1(e))  +  (l-I(e))u(w,(e)) 
s.t. 
n(8)  2 0 
The  first-order conditions for this problem are: vi)  Ut(w2(8)){8f'(C(l-1(8)(1-X)1N)  -  B  = 
CU(B+sl(8))  -  u(w~(8))l -  U'(W'+S,(B))CB+S~(B)-W~(~)I  t 
y3(8)/(1-X-yl-y2)[U(B+~1(8))  - U(w1+s1(8))I 
where  l(8') =  0,  and  q(8') =  1. 
Using va)  and  vb)  to  simplify ii)  yields: 
The  solution to  this problem is identical to that given in  the previous 
section except  for the inclusion of the costate variable,  y3(8>,  which 
becomes  binding in "bad  enough"  states of nature.  It  can  be  shown  that 
y3(8) >  0,  implying that in  states of nature where  a large fraction of a 
given cohort of workers  is being laid off,  the severance payment  offered to 
departing workers  increases,  while the wage  offered to  the job stayers and  the 
severance  payment  given to  laid-off workers  decreases.  However,  this is  not 
sufficient to explain involuntary unemployment.  In  fact,  laid-off workers  are better off than  their employed  counterparts.  This occurs because  firms 
can  tax departing workers.  If a worker  receives  a job offer  and  pretends  that 
he  did not find other employment,  then the worker  will earn  w,(8)  when  he 
is not laid off.  To  see  the  importance of  this assumption,  consider  the case 
when  firms cannot  tax departing workers.  In  this case,  the worker  can  quit 
and  earn w'  instead of staying and  earning w,(8).  The  effect of the 
incentive compatibility constraint will be  to reduce  ~~(8)  and  increase 
s,(8>.  The  severance  payment  to laid-off  workers  will then be  less than 
necessary to  compensate  them for being laid off. 
To  modify  the problem so  that firms cannot  choose  the  separation rates of 
workers,  the incentive compatibility given earlier must  be  modified: 
The  optimal  contract wi  11  then be  to  choose  {w, (8),  w2(8),  s,(8), 
sl(8),  yl(8),  y2(8), I(@),  X,  n(8),  N)  to  solve: 
max  EV(w,,  ~~(81,  sq(8),  s I (8),  q(8),  I(@),  X) To  solve this problem, I will assume that w' is large enough so that 
states of the world will exist such that w,  <  w'.  Otherwise, the results 
will  be identical  to that given.above  and thus will  not explain involuntary 
unemployment.  The first-order conditions for this problem are: 
vii)  U'(w2(8)){8f'(C(1-1(B))(1-X)1N)  - B) 
=  U1(wz(B))[w,(0)  -  (B+s1(0))1  -  CU(wz(0))  - U(B+S~(B))I 
+  U'(w,(B)>  - U"(B+sl(B)>  where l(0')  =  0  and q(8')  =  1. Using v)  and vi)  to simplify  ii)  yields: 
i ia)  U1(w2(8)>  =  y,  (1-1)  for all 8. 
(1-1-yz-ys(8)) 
When no workers are laid off, the model  produces a result similar to that 
in the previous section; all  the workers who receive job offers will  be 
permitted to leave.  When workers are laid off, however, there is production 
efficiency except in certain bad states of nature where there is 
overemployment.  This occurs because comparing iia) and  iv) indicates that 
when a large fraction of the labor force is being laid off, there will  be 
involuntary unemployment.  The reason is that in order to get the job finders 
to  truthfully reveal that they have found jobs, the severance payment to 
laid-off workers needs to be constrained.  This differs from the result given 
earlier in this section, because when firms cannot tax workers only severance 
payments need to be constrained, rather than both severance payments and 
second-period wages.  Job finders will  then truthfully reveal when they 
receive offers. 
The condition for involuntary unemployment to exist seems particularly 
strong, since it requires a large fraction of  the firm's labor force to be 
laid off.  However, the condition does not seem unreasonable if the condition 
is reinterpreted as a plant closing, or where a large fraction of a given 
cohort of workers is  laid off.  The latter might arise in more complex models 
with firm-specific human capital which have a lay-off rule based on seniority. 
The model  predicts that severance payments to both quits and lay offs will 
be state independent except during downturns.  During severe downturns, the severance  payment  or bonus  offered in the first  phase  of the labor force 
adjustment  will actually increase.  This  is  so  that workers  who  find jobs  will 
truthfully reveal  their job offers.  In  addition,  during these downturns  the 
severance  payments  to laid-off workers  will decrease  so  that they are 
involuntarily laid off. 
Because  of the complexity of  notation,  I  have  assumed  that s,  >  0,  or 
that the non-negativity constraint on  the severance payment  offered  to those 
who  find outside offers is not binding.  Allowing this constraint to  be 
binding does  not affect the results. 
A  criticism of the current model  is that while it  extends  Azariadis' 
model,  it  still  predicts that severance  payments  should be  paid to  laid-off 
workers.  This  is  in light of  recent evidence  by Oswald,  that relatively few 
industries actually offer some  form of  severance payments,  although over 50 
percent of manufacturing  industries do offer such  payments.  If this model  is 
extended,  however,  so  that workers  can  save,  instead of all savings  and 
dissavings being provided by  the firm,  the present model  will predict that 
severance payments  might not be  as  prevalent as  earlier predicted. 
Once  savings  are permitted one  would  not necessarily predict firms to save 
for workers.  If savings are permitted before  the realization of the shock  to 
firm production in  the second  period,  then workers  would  save  in  the first 
period an  amount  equal  to the severance  payment  offered to  quits in  the 
previous analysis.  That  is,  savings  would be  s,(8> for 8  >  8' where 
8' is defined to  be  the cutoff at which  s,  increases  and  s, decreases. 
The  result would be  severance  payments  offered only to  workers  who  want  to 
voluntarily leave  the firm  during bad  shocks  to industry demand.  Casual 
empiricism suggests  that indeed during downturns  firms do offer bonuses  to those  who  want  to  voluntarily leave  the  firm.  However,  this prediction could 
be  verified by  future empirical  work.  The  model  with savings  also decreases 
the amount  of severance payments  that is  offered to  laid-off workers.  This 
might help explain the seeming  lack of severance  payments  to  workers  in  most 
industries.  Of  course,  allowing workers  to save  will change  the first order 
conditions,  since  there would  be  another  constraint placed on  the problem. 
However,  this constraint would  be  independent  of 8  and  thus  would  not affect 
the qualitative results of the paper. 
IV  .  CONCLUSIONS 
The  goal  of this paper  was  to  investigate the conditions under  which 
involuntary unemployment  can  result in  a  standard  implicit contracts model 
that includes  the possibility of  on-the-job search.  The  results were 
encouraging;  it  was  shown  that under  certain conditions involuntary 
unemployment  can  exist.  The  conditions necessary  to  achieve  this result were: 
1)  Firms  cannot observe a worker's  search  intensity,  2)  Firms  cannot monitor 
which workers  receive  job offers,  and  3)  Firms  cannot  tax departing workers. 
The  question of whether  or not the conditions necessary  to  explain involuntary 
unemployment  occur  often enough  to  explain the "observed" involuntary 
unemployment  cannot  be  answered.  The  paper  also showed  that firms will have  a 
two-tier procedure  for adjusting its labor force to  current economic 
conditions.  In  the first  round,  a model  with savings  implies  that workers 
with outside offers would  leave  without the inducement  of  severance  payments; 
in  the second round,  the firm  adjusts its labor force by  either laying off additional workers or hiring new  workers.  The  model  implies that workers  will 
leave  the firm  and  new  workers  will be  hired by  the firm, although all workers 
are assumed  to  be  equally productive.  This occurs because,  ex  ante,  firms 
have  to  offer contracts,  which  gives workers  the necessary incentives  to 
engage  in  on-the-job search,  which  also implies subsidizing them  when  they 
leave  the firm.  However,  ex  post,  since firms cannot observe who  receives  job 
offers,  they  wi  11  find it  profitable to  hire new  workers  to  replace those  who 
quit. 
One  frequent  criticism  of the above  analysis is that it  implies that firms 
are  subsidizing workers  to  engage  in  more  on-the-job search.  Ex  ante 
contracts will be  chosen  so that workers  will find it  optimal  to  engage  in 
such  search activity,  however,  ex  post it  would  not be  surprising to think 
that firms  are  in  some  sense  antagonistic  to such  activity.  Firms  will, of 
course,  wish  that none  of their workers  are successful  in their job search. 
Similarly,  another  way  of thinking about  the problem is that firms sign 
contracts that reduce worker mobility in  order  to  partially insure workers 
against income  changes. 
This paper  showed  why  complete  insurance  to laid-off workers  would not be 
optimal,  given the incentive compatibility constraints.  Additional  empirical 
work  is necessary  to  answer  the question of whether  the amount  of severance 
payments  predicted by  models,  such  as  the present one,  occurs  in  the  world. 
One  reason the amount  of severance  payments  offered by  firms might not be  that 
extensive,  is  because of state-mandated  unemployment  benefits.  Theory 
suggests  that the two are  substitutes;  thus,  increases  in  state-provided 
unemployment  insurance  should decrease  private severance payment  programs. 
Future empirical  work  can be  conducted  to  see if  privately financed 
unemployment  benefits decrease  with increases  in  state-provided unemployment 
insurance. Endnotes 
1)  For  example,  Blau  (1986)  finds that for less effort, employed  searchers 
receive more  job offers than unemployed  job searchers.  However,  due  to 
unobserved  differences between  employed  and  unemployed  searchers,  his data 
remains  purely suggestive. 
2)  For  example,  Lucas  has  argued:  "Involuntary unemployment  is  not a fact or 
a phenomenon  which  is the  task of theorists to  explain.  It is, on  the 
contrary,  a theoretical  construct which Keynes  introduced in  the hopes  it 
would  be  helpful  in  discovering an  explanation for a genuine phenomenon: 
large-scale fluctuations in total employment." 
3)  The  problem  is actually  the  social planner's problem.  The  "dual" problem 
where  the  firm  maximizes  its profits subject to  an  individual rationality 
constraint for the worker,  does  not affect the results. 
4)  To  see  this,  compare  iia) with iii).  Since  U1(w'+sl(B>>  <  U1(B+sl(B)) 
then U1(w2)  >  U1(B+sI(B)) or that B+sl(e)  >  w,(B). References 
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